Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions

Robert Wilson ()

Economic Theory, 1998, vol. 12, issue 2, 433-440

Abstract: The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations. A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the predictions derived from the model.

Date: 1998-08-19
Note: Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997
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