Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

From:
Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Gains from manipulating social choice rules pp. 349-371: Donald Campbell and Jerry Kelly
Optimal formation rules for patent pools pp. 373-388: Steffen Brenner
The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness? pp. 389-403: Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller
Preference for flexibility in the absence of learning: the risk attitude effect pp. 405-426: Stefano Ficco and Vladimir Karamychev
A theory of reference-dependent behavior pp. 427-455: Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Ballester
Non-convex aggregate technology and optimal economic growth pp. 457-471: N. Hung, Cuong Le van and Philippe Michel
Non-stationary, stable Markov processes on a continuous state space pp. 473-496: Carsten Nielsen
Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions pp. 497-507: Paulo Monteiro
Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions pp. 509-528: Tymofiy Mylovanov and Thomas Tröger

Profit maximization and supermodular technology pp. 173-183: Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique
On the foundation of stability pp. 185-201: Xiao Luo
A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol pp. 203-226: Sang-Chul Suh and Quan Wen
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness pp. 227-245: Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Queue-rationed equilibria with fixed costs of waiting pp. 247-274: Brennan Platt
When does a developing country use new technologies? pp. 275-300: Olivier Bruno, Cuong Van and Benoît Masquin
The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining pp. 301-332: Jonas Björnerstedt and Andreas Westermark
The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game pp. 333-338: Thomas Liggett, Steven Lippman and Richard Rumelt
The Zilcha criteria for dynamic inefficiency reconsidered pp. 339-348: Martin Barbie and Ashok Kaul

Changes in the firms behavior after the opening of markets of allowances pp. 1-25: Antoine Mandel
Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good pp. 27-45: Marco LiCalzi and Antonio Nicolo'
On the impossibility of representing infinite utility streams pp. 47-56: Juan Crespo, Carmelo Nuñez and Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility pp. 57-90: Fabien Prieur
Mutually acceptable courses of action pp. 91-112: Joseph Greenberg, Sudheer Gupta and Xiao Luo
The optimal harvesting problem with a land market: a characterization of the asymptotic convergence pp. 113-138: Adriana Piazza
Generalized contest success functions pp. 139-149: Birendra Rai and Rajiv Sarin
Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games pp. 151-171: Xavier Vives

Evolution in games with a continuous action space pp. 355-376: Matthijs van Veelen and Peter Spreij
Ramsey fiscal policy and endogenous growth pp. 377-398: Hyun Park
Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness pp. 399-424: Guoqiang Tian and Liyan Yang
Rewarding effort pp. 425-441: Alexander Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden
Competitive sprawl pp. 443-460: Steven Heubeck
Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains pp. 461-471: M. Sanver
Precautionary saving in the presence of other risks: a comment pp. 473-476: Mario Menegatti
A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: the case of independent types pp. 477-489: Tilman Börgers and Peter Norman
A remark on the measurability of large games pp. 491-494: Guilherme Carmona
Conditional ordering extensions pp. 495-503: José Alcantud
Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism pp. 505-512: Lars Ehlers
Multiple solutions under quasi-exponential discounting pp. 513-526: Nicolas Vieille and Jörgen Weibull

State prices, liquidity, and default pp. 177-194: Raphael Espinoza, Charles. Goodhart and Dimitrios Tsomocos
Some benefits of cyclical monetary policy pp. 195-216: Ricardo Cavalcanti and Ed Nosal
Market crashes, speculation and learning in financial markets pp. 217-229: Patrick Leoni
Asset trading volume in a production economy pp. 231-258: Emilio Espino and Thomas Hintermaier
Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon’s dilemma pp. 259-268: Cheng-Zhong Qin and Chun-Lei Yang
Status-seeking behavior, the evolution of income inequality, and growth pp. 269-289: Koichi Kawamoto
Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs pp. 291-306: Toshiji Miyakawa
Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach pp. 307-330: Yuan Ju and David Wettstein
Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result pp. 331-352: Hiroaki Ino and Tomohiko Kawamori
Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result pp. 353-353: Hiroaki Ino and Tomohiko Kawamori

The probability approach to general equilibrium with production pp. 1-41: Michael Magill and Martine Quinzii
An extension of the multi-output state-contingent production model pp. 43-64: Walter Briec and Laurent Cavaignac
An extension of the multi-output state-contingent production model pp. 65-66: Walter Briec and Laurent Cavaignac
Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery pp. 67-92: Joao Correia-da-Silva and Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Growth and distribution in an AK-model with endogenous impatience pp. 93-112: Kirill Borissov and Stéphane Lambrecht
An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective pp. 113-128: Alexey Malakhov and Rakesh Vohra
The geometry of optimal taxation: a primal approach pp. 129-155: Martin Barbie and Claudia Hermeling
A new integral for capacities pp. 157-176: Ehud Lehrer