Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 22, issue 4, 2003

Core and Walrasian equilibria when agents' characteristics are extremely dispersed pp. 699-725

Konrad Podczeck

Existence and optimality of oligopoly equilibria in linear exchange economies pp. 727-741

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Michael Florig

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment pp. 743-771

Cuong Le van and Yiannis Vailakis

A two-sector overlapping generations model with heterogeneous capital pp. 773-792

Karl Farmer and Ron Wendner

Financial intermediation and entry-deterrence pp. 793-815

Neelam Jain, Thomas Jeitschko and Leonard Mirman

The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets pp. 817-829

Jean Gabszewicz and Xavier Wauthy

Arbitrary small indivisibilities pp. 831-843

Michael Florig

Partition function bargaining with public demands pp. 845-862

Maarten F. Cornet

On the geography of conventions pp. 863-873

Andreas Blume and Ted Loch Temzelides

Purification of incentive compatible allocations pp. 875-892

James Bergin

Theorems on correspondences and stability of the core pp. 893-902

Farhad Hüsseinov

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice pp. 903-905

Federico Echenique

A simple axiomatization and constructive representation proof for choquet expected utility pp. 907-915

Alain Chateauneuf, Jürgen Eichberger and Simon Grant

Optimal fiscal policy in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externalities pp. 917-925

Manuel Gómez

The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis pp. 927-933

Christian At and Pierre-Henri Morand

Volume 22, issue 3, 2003

Ranking investment projects pp. 469-494

James Foster and Tapan Mitra

Exact arbitrage and portfolio analysis in large asset markets pp. 495-528

M. Khan and Yeneng Sun

Unsettling aspects of voting theory pp. 529-555

Donald G. Saari

A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule pp. 557-568

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Implementation in teams pp. 569-581

Shasikanta Nandeibam

Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining pp. 583-606

Hongbin Cai

Background risk in generalized expected utility theory pp. 607-611

John Quiggin

Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information pp. 613-627

Stefan Maus

Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy pp. 629-660

Gabriele Camera, Charles Noussair and Steven Tucker

Indeterminacy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply pp. 661-669

Qinglai Meng and Andrés Velasco

A new proof of the maximum principle pp. 671-674

Ngo Long and Koji Shimomura

Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions pp. 675-683

Oleksii Birulin

The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability pp. 685-688

Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan

Medical insurance with rank-dependent utility pp. 689-698

Matthew J. Ryan and Rhema Vaithianathan

Volume 22, issue 2, 2003

Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice pp. 233-243

Lars Ehlers and John Weymark

Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection pp. 245-262

Max R. Blouin

Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game pp. 263-288

Miguel Costa-Gomes and Klaus Zauner

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition pp. 289-309

Ramon Faulí-Oller, Efe Ok and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

Parimutuel betting markets as information aggregation devices: experimental results pp. 311-351

Charles Plott, Jorgen Wit and Winston C. Yang

Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring pp. 353-374

Massimiliano Amarante

Incentive compatible contractible information pp. 375-394

Philip Bond

Discounting long run average growth in stochastic dynamic programs pp. 395-413

Jorge Durán

A short and intuitive proof of Marshall's Rule pp. 415-418

Christian Ewerhart

Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information pp. 419-429

Roman Inderst

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions pp. 431-446

Effrosyni Diamantoudi

Stochastic convexity in dynamic programming pp. 447-455

Alp Atakan

Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents pp. 457-467

Gautam Bose

Volume 22, issue 1, 2003

Generic inefficiency of equilibria in the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and infinite time pp. 1-15

Felix Kubler and Karl Schmedders

Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public “bad” economies pp. 17-31

Benyamin Shitovitz and Menahem Spiegel

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities pp. 33-44

Federico Echenique

Dictatorial domains pp. 45-62

Navin Aswal, Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen pp. 63-88

Reiko Gotoh and Naoki Yoshihara

Optimal design of pension funds: a mission impossible? pp. 89-110

Anja De Waegenaere, Jeroen Suijs and Peter Borm

Quasi-fundamental exchange rate variation pp. 111-140

Steven Russell

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles pp. 141-168

Tetsuo Ono

Sunspot cycles pp. 169-192

Julio Dávila

An algebraic theory of portfolio allocation pp. 193-210

David Hennessy and Harvey Lapan

On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions pp. 211-217

Hideki Mizukami

A note on Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu's “Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterization of some decision rules” pp. 219-225

Ritxar Arlegi

On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly pp. 227-232

Rabah Amir and Isabel Grilo