K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

Dov Monderer () and Moshe Tennenholtz ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 24, issue 2, 255-270

Abstract: This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, $k\ge 1$ , all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendation to organizers of auctions is to conduct k-price auctions, $k\ge 3$ in environments in which buyers are risk-seeking. The recommendation is given both for, a setup in which each organizer is a monopolist, and for one of oligopolistic competition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Competition in auction design; Fun seeking; Internet auctions; Risk averse agents; Risk seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x

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