Strategic quotas on foreign investment and migration

Reza Oladi

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 24, issue 2, 289-306

Abstract: A basic two-country, single commodity model is considered to formulate the interactive and retaliative policies with regard to restrictions on foreign investment and labor migration. We model quota retaliations using the contingent threat situation. Under three different strategic environments, we characterize the stable quotas on factor movements. Among other things, we illustrate that either one of the two countries may end up with welfare loss- Ramaswami trap, a concept we introduce in this paper. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Foreign investment; Migration; Labor and capital mobility; Theory of social situations (TOSS). (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0425-9

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