Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Chaotic Tatonnement pp. 437-45: Venkatesh Bala and Mukul Majumdar
Fiat Money in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model pp. 447-64: S. Aiyagari and Neil Wallace
Fully Endogenous Mechanism Selection on Finite Outcome Sets pp. 465-80: Roger Lagunoff
Equilibrium in Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Information pp. 481-94: Subir K Chakrabarti
Parallel Search for the Best Alternative pp. 495-507: Tara Vishwanath
Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms pp. 509-24: Frank Page
Stochastic Innovation and Product Market Organization pp. 525-45: Stanley S Reynolds and R. Isaac
Recursive Utility and Optimal Capital Accumulation II: Sensitivity and Duality Theory pp. 547-63: Robert Becker and John Boyd
Characterizing Stochastically Monotone Functions by Multiattribute Utility Theory pp. 565-66: Peter Wakker

The Structure of Sunspot Equilibria in the Presence of Incomplete Financial Markets: Introduction pp. 307-08: David Cass
Real Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Sunspot Economy with Inside Money pp. 309-19: Shinichi Suda, Jean-Marc Tallon and Antonio Villanacci
The Structure of the Set of Sunspot Equilibria in Economies with Incomplete Financial Markets pp. 321-40: Tito Pietra
Sunspots and Incomplete Financial Markets: The General Case pp. 341-58: David Cass
The Aggregated Excess Demand Function and Other Aggregation Procedures pp. 359-88: Donald G Saari
Competitive Equilibria in Overlapping Generations Experiments pp. 389-426: Charalambos D Aliprantis and Charles Plott
A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players pp. 427-33: Kali Rath

The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach pp. 155-90: Jess Benhabib and Roy Radner
Second Best Equilibria for Games of Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset pp. 191-96: Aldo Rustichini
Markovian Equilibrium in a Class of Stochastic Games: Existence Theorems for Discounted and Undiscounted Models pp. 197-214: Prajit K Dutta and Rangarajan Sundaram
A General-Equilibrium Intertemporal Model of an Open Economy pp. 215-46: John Chipman and Guoqiang Tian
General Equilibrium with Differentiated Commodities: The Linear Activity Model without Joint Production pp. 247-63: Konrad Podczeck
Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard pp. 265-81: Frank Page
Transaction Costs and the Use of Cash and Credit pp. 283-96: S L Schreft
An Alternative Proof for the Linear Utility Representation Theorem pp. 298-302: Walter Trockel

Measurement Distortion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts pp. 1-26: Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale
Hierarchical Arrow Social Welfare Functions pp. 27-41: Thomas E Armstrong
On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems pp. 43-68: Timothy Kehoe, David Levine and Paul Romer
The Borda Method Is Most Likely to Respect the Condorcet Principle pp. 69-83: Jill Van Newenhizen
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions pp. 85-101: Michael Peters
The Nonatomic Assignment Model pp. 103-27: Neil E Gretsky, Joseph Ostroy and William Zame
Inessentiality of Large Groups and the Approximate Core Property: An Equivalence Theorem pp. 129-47: Myrna Wooders
Debreu's Gap Theorem pp. 150-52: A F Beardon

On the Generic Nonconvergence of Bayesian Actions and Beliefs pp. 301-21: M Feldman
Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection pp. 323-38: Frank Page
On Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Distributions for Games with Differential Information and Discontinuous Payoffs pp. 339-54: Erik Balder
Ethnic Groups and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Trade Model pp. 355-71: M. Khan
Efficient Budget Balancing Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring pp. 373-83: Dominique Demougin and Arthur Fishman
The Closedness of the Free-Disposal Hull of a Production Set pp. 386-91: Anthony Horsley and Andrew Wrobel

On the Arbitrage Pricing Theory pp. 213-29: Christian Gilles and Stephen LeRoy
Polynomial Utility pp. 231-49: G Fuhrken and Marcel Richter
The Subjective Expected.Utility Hypothesis and Revealed Preference pp. 251-63: T Kim
Real Indeterminacy in Incomplete Financial Market Economies without Aggregate Risk pp. 265-76: P Siconolfi and Antonio Villanacci
Demand Deposit Contracts, Suspension of Convertibility, and Optimal Financial Intermediation pp. 277-88: A P Villamil
A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements pp. 290-92: Abhinay Muthoo
A Simple Exposition of Some Basic Results of Implicit Contract Theory pp. 293-97: Stephen R Blough

Indefinitely Sustained Consumption Despite Exhaustible Natural Resources pp. 119-46: David Cass and Tapan Mitra
Non-parametric Estimation of Deterministically Chaotic Systems pp. 147-67: Mahmoud El-Gamal
When Is the Core Equivalence Theorem Valid? pp. 169-82: Charalombos Aliprantis and Owen Burkinshaw
The Core of an Economy with Differential Information pp. 183-97: Nicholas C Yannelis
An Example of the Peleg and Yaari Economy pp. 200-204: Robert Becker
On Constrained Optimal Allocations with Incomplete Markets pp. 205-09: Jan Werner

Spanning, Valuation and Options pp. 3-12: Donald Brown and Stephen Ross
Linear Models of Economic Survival under Production Uncertainty pp. 13-30: Mukul Majumdar and Roy Radner
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms pp. 31-44: Alvin Roth and John H Vande Vate
Indeterminacy in Incomplete Market Economies pp. 45-61: Andreu Mas-Colell
Hours and Employment Variation in Business Cycle Theory pp. 63-81: Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott
Additive Utility pp. 83-105: Gebhard Fuhrken and Marcel Richter
On Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, the K-K-M-S Theorem and the Core of a Balanced Game pp. 108-16: Lloyd Shapley and Rajiv Vohra