Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 72, issue 4, 2021

Dynamic coordination via organizational routines pp. 1001-1047

Andreas Blume, April Mitchell Franco and Paul Heidhues

Reputation and the “need for enemies” pp. 1049-1089

Maxime Menuet and Patrick Villieu

Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles pp. 1091-1120

Paul H. Edelman and John Weymark

Growth and welfare effects of intellectual property rights when consumers differ in income pp. 1121-1170

Christian Kiedaisch

Tempting goods, self-control fatigue, and time preference in consumer dynamics pp. 1171-1216

Shinsuke Ikeda and Takeshi Ojima

Competitive equilibria in a comonotone market pp. 1217-1255

Tim J. Boonen, Fangda Liu and Ruodu Wang

On Markovian collective choice with heterogeneous quasi-hyperbolic discounting pp. 1257-1296

Jean-Pierre Drugeon and Bertrand Wigniolle

Prices versus auctions in large markets pp. 1297-1337

Hanzhe Zhang

How to choose a fair delegation? pp. 1339-1373

Burak Can, Péter Csóka and Emre Ergin

Discrete Arrow–Pratt indexes for risk and uncertainty pp. 1375-1393

Aurelien Baillon and Olivier L’Haridon

Volume 72, issue 3, 2021

Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues pp. 701-704

Emir Kamenica, Kyungmin Kim and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade? pp. 705-721

Jacopo Bizzotto and Adrien Vigier

Resisting persuasion pp. 723-742

Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment pp. 743-764

Daehong Min

Correction to: Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment pp. 765-765

Daehong Min

Competitive disclosure of correlated information pp. 767-799

Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai

Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences pp. 801-833

Zhiwei Liu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Information transmission and voting pp. 835-868

Yingni Guo

Persuasion with costly precision pp. 869-908

Arianna Degan and Ming Li

Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver pp. 909-953

Ju Hu and Xi Weng

Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms pp. 955-1000

Maxim Ivanov

Volume 72, issue 2, 2021

Iterated dominance revisited pp. 377-421

Amanda Friedenberg and H. Jerome Keisler

How stationarity contradicts intergenerational equity pp. 423-444

Geir Asheim, Kuntal Banerjee and Tapan Mitra

On defining ex ante payoffs in games with diffuse prior pp. 445-472

Attila Ambrus and Aaron Kolb

Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets pp. 473-509

Jaerim Choi

Ranking by weighted sum pp. 511-532

Tapan Mitra and Kemal Ozbek

Reaching across the aisle to block reforms pp. 533-578

Valerio Dotti

Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information pp. 579-614

Heski Bar-Isaac, Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver

Eventual periodicity in the two-sector RSL model: equilibrium vis-à-vis optimum growth pp. 615-639

Liuchun Deng, Minako Fujio and M. Khan

Stochastic expected utility for binary choice: a ‘modular’ axiomatic foundation pp. 641-669

Matthew Ryan

Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals pp. 671-700

Sambuddha Ghosh, Yan Long and Manipushpak Mitra

Volume 72, issue 1, 2021

Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants pp. 1-19

Eun Jeong Heo, Sunghoon Hong and Youngsub Chun

Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations pp. 21-48

Marco Faravelli and Priscilla Man

Language and coordination games pp. 49-92

Melody Lo

Nominal exchange rate determination and dynamics in an OLG framework pp. 93-132

Mauro Bambi and Sara Eugeni

Price probabilities: a class of Bayesian and non-Bayesian prediction rules pp. 133-166

Filippo Massari

Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi’s impartial observer pp. 167-199

Abhinash Borah

A Model of Secular Migration from Centralized to Decentralized Trade pp. 201-244

Zhifeng Cai and Feng Dong

An axiomatic foundation of conditional logit pp. 245-261

Yves Breitmoser

Climate policy: How to deal with ambiguity? pp. 263-301

Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva and Natacha Raffin

Stag Hunt with unknown outside options pp. 303-335

Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman and Chang Zhao

The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality pp. 337-375

Dawen Meng and Guoqiang Tian

Volume 71, issue 4, 2021

Who should exert more effort? Risk aversion, downside risk aversion and optimal prevention pp. 1259-1281

Richard Peter

Network formation with myopic and farsighted players pp. 1283-1317

Chenghong Luo, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Vertical differentiation and trade among symmetric countries pp. 1319-1355

Pierre Picard and Alessandro Tampieri

Government financing, inflation, and the financial sector pp. 1357-1396

Bernardino Adão and Andre Silva

Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability pp. 1397-1428

Jan Klingelhöfer

Dynamic effects of patent policy on innovation and inequality in a Schumpeterian economy pp. 1429-1465

Angus Chu, Yuichi Furukawa, Sushanta Mallick, Pietro Peretto and Xilin Wang

Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs pp. 1467-1497

Spyros Galanis

Rawls’s difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis pp. 1499-1525

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato

Effects of competition in first-price auctions pp. 1527-1567

Gino Loyola

Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms pp. 1569-1589

Jung S. You and Ruben Juarez

Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information pp. 1591-1648

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Optimal capital requirements with noisy signals on banking risk pp. 1649-1687

Kai Ding, Enoch Hill and David Perez-Reyna

Volume 71, issue 3, 2021

Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis pp. 795-798

Bernard Cornet, M. Khan, David Levine and Edward Prescott

The Yannelis–Prabhakar theorem on upper semi-continuous selections in paracompact spaces: extensions and applications pp. 799-840

M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Working alone and working with others: implications for the malthusian era pp. 841-875

Kartik Ahuja, Mihaela Schaar and William Zame

The economics of platforms in a Walrasian framework pp. 877-924

Anil K. Jain and Robert M. Townsend

On stochastic independence under ambiguity pp. 925-960

Federica Ceron and Vassili Vergopoulos

Live fast, die young: equilibrium and survival in large economies pp. 961-996

Arthur Beddock and Elyès Jouini

Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games pp. 997-1032

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Divergence and convergence in Scarf cycle environments: experiments and predictability in the dynamics of general equilibrium systems pp. 1033-1084

Benjamin J. Gillen, Masayoshi Hirota, Ming Hsu, Charles R. Plott and Brian W. Rogers

The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour pp. 1085-1119

Achille Basile, Robert P. Gilles, Maria Graziano and Marialaura Pesce

On the optimality of monetary trading pp. 1121-1160

Guilherme Carmona

Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies pp. 1161-1187

Peter Hammond, Lei Qiao and Yeneng Sun

Optimal consumption and portfolio choice with ambiguous interest rates and volatility pp. 1189-1202

Qian Lin and Frank Riedel

Oligopoly with network effects: firm-specific versus single network pp. 1203-1230

Rabah Amir, Igor Evstigneev and Adriana Gama

Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests pp. 1231-1258

Ori Haimanko

Volume 71, issue 2, 2021

Multidimensional inequalities and generalized quantile functions pp. 375-409

Sinem Bas, Philippe Bich and Alain Chateauneuf

Topological connectedness and behavioral assumptions on preferences: a two-way relationship pp. 411-460

M. Khan and Metin Uyanık

Characterizing sustainability in discrete time pp. 461-481

Geir Asheim and Tapan Mitra

Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism pp. 483-504

David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer

Determinate perfect foresight forecasting in overlapping generations models pp. 505-531

Eungsik Kim and Stephen Spear

Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice pp. 533-552

Qianfeng Tang and Yongchao Zhang

The lexicographic method in preference theory pp. 553-577

Michael Mandler

The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension pp. 579-601

Xiao Luo, Xuewen Qian and Yang Sun

Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games pp. 603-662

Jeroen Kuipers, János Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers and Koos Vrieze

The multiple priors of the open-minded decision maker pp. 663-692

Martin Dumav and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Categorical consideration and perception complementarity pp. 693-716

Edward Honda

Internalization of social cost in congestion games pp. 717-760

Igal Milchtaich

Quality growth: from process to product innovation along the path of development pp. 761-793

Esteban Jaimovich

Volume 71, issue 1, 2021

Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players pp. 1-31

Chantal Marlats

Ranking distributions of an ordinal variable pp. 33-80

Nicolas Gravel, Brice Magdalou and Patrick Moyes

Indeterminacy of Cournot–Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets pp. 81-114

Michael Zierhut

Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts? pp. 115-149

Torben M. Andersen and Joydeep Bhattacharya

Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism pp. 151-183

Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof and Oriol Tejada

Decision making within a product network pp. 185-209

Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Elchin Suleymanov

Full and constrained Pareto efficiency with incomplete financial markets pp. 211-234

Concetta Mendolicchio and Tito Pietra

Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction pp. 235-250

Thomas Norman

Capital accumulation game with quasi-geometric discounting and consumption externalities pp. 251-281

Koichi Futagami and Yuta Nakabo

Security creation costs and economic development pp. 283-304

Pedro Amaral and Erwan Quintin

Does moral play equilibrate? pp. 305-315

Immanuel Bomze, Werner Schachinger and Jörgen Weibull

Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality pp. 317-339

Sander Heinsalu

Generic regularity of differentiated product oligopolies pp. 341-374

Michael Zierhut