Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 4, No 11, 1648 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper extends Selten’s (Int J Game Theory 4:25–55, 1975) notion of perfection to normal-form games of incomplete information and provides conditions on the primitives of a game that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium. The existence results, which allow for arbitrary (compact, metric) type and/or action spaces and payoff discontinuities, are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions and Cournot games with incomplete information and cost discontinuities.

Keywords: Infinite game of incomplete information; Perfect Bayes–Nash equilibrium; Payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Perfect Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01311-y

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