Economics at your fingertips  

Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms

Jung S. You and Ruben Juarez ()
Additional contact information
Jung S. You: California State University, East Bay
Ruben Juarez: University of Hawaii

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 4, No 10, 1569-1589

Abstract: Abstract We consider mechanisms for allocating a fixed amount of divisible resources among multiple agents when they have quasilinear preferences and can only report messages in a one-dimensional space. We show that in contrast with infinite-dimensional message spaces, efficiency is neither compatible with implementation in dominant strategies nor compatible with implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, for the weaker notion of implementation, such as in the Nash equilibrium, we find that a class of ‘VCG-like’ mechanisms is the only efficient selection in one-dimensional message spaces. The trifecta in mechanism design, namely efficiency, fairness, and simplicity of implementation, is achieved via a mechanism that we introduce and characterize in this paper.

Keywords: Resource-sharing; Cost-sharing; Implementation; Envy-free; VCG mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01342-z

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2022-01-04
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:71:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00199-021-01342-z