Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games

Jeroen Kuipers (), János Flesch (), Gijs Schoenmakers () and Koos Vrieze ()
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Jeroen Kuipers: Maastricht University
János Flesch: Maastricht University
Gijs Schoenmakers: Maastricht University
Koos Vrieze: Maastricht University

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 2, No 9, 603-662

Abstract: Abstract We consider sequential multi-player games with perfect information and with deterministic transitions. The players receive a reward upon termination of the game, which depends on the state where the game was terminated. If the game does not terminate, then the rewards of the players are equal to zero. We prove that, for every game in this class, a subgame perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium exists, for all $$\varepsilon > 0$$ ε > 0 . The proof is constructive and suggests a finite algorithm to calculate such an equilibrium.

Keywords: Perfect information game; Recursive game; Subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01260-6

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