Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism

Hans Gersbach, Stephan Imhof () and Oriol Tejada
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Stephan Imhof: Swiss National Bank

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 1, No 5, 183 pages

Abstract: Abstract We examine public project provision and redistribution in a model of legislative bargaining and provide a foundation of how to channel the say. We consider a large and heterogeneous legislature and show that socially optimal outcomes are obtained by a mechanism based on the majority rule that involves two proposal-making rounds, with the minority moving first and the majority moving second.

Keywords: Legislative bargaining; Majority rule; Incomplete social contracts; Public project provision; Transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01236-1

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