Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 52, issue 3, 2013

An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games pp. 833-861

Subhasish Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman Sheremeta

The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity pp. 863-884

László Kóczy and Alexandru Nichifor

Ideology and endogenous constitutions pp. 885-913

Alessandro Riboni

Reputation from nested activities pp. 915-940

Guillermo Ordonez

A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection pp. 941-977

Vincent Anesi and Philippe De Donder

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition pp. 979-1004

Alex Dickson and Roger Hartley

Second-order ambiguous beliefs pp. 1005-1037

Leandro Nascimento and Gil Riella

Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set pp. 1039-1060

Nikolai Kukushkin

Conformism and public news pp. 1061-1090

Gabriel Desgranges and Céline Rochon

Discrete Walrasian exchange process pp. 1091-1100

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Orntangar Nguenamadji

Volume 52, issue 2, 2013

Optimality of impulse harvesting policies pp. 429-459

Katrin Erdlenbruch, Alain Jean-Marie, Michel Moreaux and Mabel Tidball

Price dynamics in an exchange economy pp. 461-500

Steven Gjerstad

Welfare and excess volatility of exchange rates pp. 501-529

M. Salto and Tito Pietra

Civic duty and political advertising pp. 531-564

Arianna Degan

Taxation without commitment pp. 565-588

Catarina Reis

Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants pp. 589-630

Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger and Alexandra Schwartz

Patent protection, capital accumulation, and economic growth pp. 631-668

Tatsuro Iwaisako and Koichi Futagami

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence pp. 669-708

John Duffy, Huan Xie and Yong-Ju Lee

Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion pp. 709-728

Daniel Krähmer and Rebecca Stone

A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization pp. 729-754

Zhixiong Zeng

A Schumpeterian growth model with random quality improvements pp. 755-791

Antonio Minniti, Carmelo Parello and Paul Segerstrom

Niche products, generic products, and consumer search pp. 793-832

Nathan Larson

Volume 52, issue 1, 2013

Agreement theorem for neo-additive beliefs pp. 1-13

Adam Dominiak and Jean-Philippe Lefort

Bargaining with subjective mixtures pp. 15-39

Craig Webb

Unawareness of theorems pp. 41-73

Spyros Galanis

Large extensive form games pp. 75-102

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

On the spatial representation of preference profiles pp. 103-128

Jon Eguia

First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders pp. 129-163

Gábor Virág

Oligarchy, democracy, and state capacity pp. 165-186

Helios Herrera and Cesar Martinelli

Unhedgeable shocks and statistical economic equilibrium pp. 187-235

Eric Smith, Duncan Foley and Benjamin Good

Existence of equilibrium in the Helpman–Krugman model of international trade with imperfect competition pp. 237-270

Lutz Arnold

Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach pp. 271-297

Leonid Polishchuk and Alexander Tonis

Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences pp. 299-313

Tommaso Gabrieli and Sayantan Ghosal

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods pp. 315-336

Diego Moreno and María Moscoso

Information revelation in competitive markets pp. 337-365

Maxim Ivanov

Deviant generations, Ricardian equivalence, and growth cycles pp. 367-396

Richard Barnett, Joydeep Bhattacharya and Helle Bunzel

On the emergence of competitive equilibrium growth cycles pp. 397-427

Jean-Pierre Drugeon

Volume 51, issue 3, 2012

Values for Markovian coalition processes pp. 505-538

Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch

Stochastic growth with short-run prediction of shocks pp. 539-580

Santanu Roy and Itzhak Zilcha

Proto-coalition bargaining and the core pp. 581-599

Yves Breitmoser

Herding with collective preferences pp. 601-626

S. Ali and Navin Kartik

New product launch: herd seeking or herd preventing? pp. 627-648

Ting Liu and Pasquale Schiraldi

Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence pp. 649-676

Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo and Thomas Palfrey

On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems pp. 677-693

Onur Kesten

Monopoly pricing when consumers are antagonized by unexpected price increases: a “cover version” of the Heidhues–Kőszegi–Rabin model pp. 695-711

Ran Spiegler

Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility pp. 713-728

Egbert Dierker and Hildegard Dierker

General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery pp. 729-755

Joao Correia-da-Silva and Carlos Hervés-Beloso

Volume 51, issue 2, 2012

Introduction pp. 241-245

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests pp. 247-275

Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley

Multi-player contests with asymmetric information pp. 277-287

Karl Wärneryd

The nature of tournaments pp. 289-313

Robert Akerlof and Richard Holden

Contests with rank-order spillovers pp. 315-350

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries

The optimal multi-stage contest pp. 351-382

Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu

Sequential two-prize contests pp. 383-395

Aner Sela

The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game pp. 397-433

Brian Roberson and Dmitriy Kvasov

Endogenous entry in contests pp. 435-463

John Morgan, Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton

Persuasion as a contest pp. 465-486

Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

Communication of preferences in contests for contracts pp. 487-503

Todd Kaplan

Volume 51, issue 1, 2012

An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences pp. 1-12

Yi-Chun Chen and Xiao Luo

Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents pp. 13-33

Francis Bloch and Nicolas Houy

Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model pp. 35-70

Francisco Alvarez Gonzalez and Cristina Mazón

Openness, managerial incentives, and heterogeneous firms pp. 71-104

Zhihong Yu

Seller competition by mechanism design pp. 105-137

Damian Damianov

The structure of Nash equilibrium tariffs pp. 139-161

Yoshitomo Ogawa

Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams pp. 163-189

Joon Song

Separability and aggregation of equivalence relations pp. 191-212

Dinko Dimitrov, Thierry Marchant and Debasis Mishra

Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium pp. 213-240

Jan Zabojnik