Large extensive form games
Carlos Alós-Ferrer and
Klaus Ritzberger
Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 52, issue 1, 75-102
Abstract:
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Keywords: Extensive form games; Sequential decision theory; Trees; C72; D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:52:y:2013:i:1:p:75-102
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y
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