Persuasion as a contest

Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 51, issue 2, 465-486

Abstract: We examine how the probability of persuading an audience depends on resources expended by contending parties as well as on other factors. We use a Bayesian approach whereby the audience makes inferences solely based on the evidence produced by the contestants. We find conditions that yield the well-known additive contest success function, including the logit function. We also find conditions that produce a generalized “difference” functional form. In all cases, there are three main determinants of audience choice: (i) the truth and other objective parameters of the environment; (ii) the biases of the audience, and (iii) the resources expended by the interested parties. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Keywords: Rent-seeking; Advertising; Litigation; Political campaigning; Property rights; C70; D20; D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Persuasion as a contest (2008)
Working Paper: Persuasion as a Contest (2007)
Working Paper: Persuasion as a Contest (2007)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0497-2

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