Sequential two-prize contests

Aner Sela

Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 51, issue 2, 383-395

Abstract: We study a two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model with two players where each player’s marginal values for the prizes are decreasing, constant, or increasing. We also analyze an equilibrium of the model with more than two players where each player’s marginal values for the prizes are nonincreasing. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Multi-stage contests; All-pay auctions; D44; D82; J31; J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008)
Working Paper: Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0547-9

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