Sequential Two-Prize Contests

Aner Sela

No 803, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players’ marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining

Keywords: Multi-prize contests; All-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential two-prize contests (2012)
Working Paper: Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0803

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