Sequential Two-Prize Contests

Aner Sela

No 6769, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study two-stage all-pay auctions with two identical prizes. In each stage, players compete for one prize. Each player may win either one or two prizes. We analyze the equilibrium strategies where players' marginal values for the prizes are either declining or inclining.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Multi-prize contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential two-prize contests (2012)
Working Paper: Sequential Two-Prize Contests (2008)
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