Herding with collective preferences

S. Ali () and Navin Kartik
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: S. Nageeb M. Ali () and Safdar Ali

Economic Theory, 2012, vol. 51, issue 3, 626 pages

Abstract: This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Social learning; Observational learning; Herd behavior; Payoff interdependence; Sequential voting; Momentum; D7; D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0609-7

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