Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Rationally misplaced confidence pp. 1-38: Derek Lemoine
Exploring infinite population utilitarianism under strong anonymity pp. 39-85: Geir Asheim, Kohei Kamaga and Stéphane Zuber
Incentives and peer effects in the workplace: On the impact of envy and wage transparency on organizational design pp. 87-124: Jenny Kragl, Benjamin Bental and Peymaneh Safaynikoo
Economy-wide consequences of credit subsidies to targeted firms pp. 125-169: Gabriel A. Madeira, Mailliw Serafim, Sergio Mikio Koyama and Fernando Kuwer
Rationalizable learning pp. 171-202: Andrew Caplin, Daniel Martin and Philip Marx
The role of risky debt and safe assets in unregulated financial intermediaries with costly state verification pp. 203-239: Francesco Carli and Pedro Gomis-Porqueras
Income disaster model with optimal consumption pp. 241-320: Seyoung Park
Egalitarian random assignment pp. 321-354: Conal Duddy
Not obviously manipulable allotment rules pp. 355-380: R. Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio
Plague and prejudice: disease, discrimination, and social exclusion pp. 381-415: Javier A. Birchenall

Topology-free type structures with conditioning events pp. 1107-1166: Pierfrancesco Guarino
Excess demand approach with non-convexity and discontinuity: a generalization of the Gale–Nikaido–Kuhn–Debreu lemma pp. 1167-1190: M. Ali Khan, Richard P. McLean and Metin Uyanik
Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy pp. 1191-1224: Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya
Exploiting overconfidence: optimal contracts with heterogeneous beliefs pp. 1225-1254: Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen
The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view pp. 1255-1281: Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Foivos Savva
Mimic martingales in sequential auctions pp. 1283-1310: Matt Van Essen and John Wooders
Homophily and spread of misinformation in random networks pp. 1311-1349: Qiang Gong and Huanxing Yang
Approximate optimality and the risk/reward tradeoff given repeated gambles pp. 1351-1381: Zengjing Chen, Larry Epstein and Guodong Zhang
Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions pp. 1383-1420: Andreas Schabert
Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints pp. 1421-1453: Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz

Gately values of cooperative games pp. 723-758: Robert P. Gilles and Lina Mallozzi
Everybody’s talkin’ at me: levels of majority language acquisition by minority language speakers pp. 759-807: William A. Brock, Bo Chen, Steven N. Durlauf and Shlomo Weber
Information design for weighted voting pp. 809-852: Toygar T. Kerman and Anastas Tenev
Capital flow freezes pp. 853-887: M. Udara Peiris, Anna Sokolova and Dimitrios P. Tsomocos
Pandemics, public policy, and Peltzman effects pp. 889-910: Alexander Dietrich, Wilhelm Kohler and Gernot Müller
On the non-uniqueness of linear Markov perfect equilibria in linear-quadratic differential games: a geometric approach pp. 911-943: Markus Eigruber and Franz Wirl
Analyzing the effects of minimum wages: a microeconomic approach pp. 945-991: Clemens Thielen and Philipp Weinschenk
Optimal procurement auctions with audit pp. 993-1054: Ottorino Chillemi and Stefano Galavotti
Probabilistic risk aversion for generalized rank-dependent functions pp. 1055-1082: Ruodu Wang and Qinyu Wu
Intermediation in networks pp. 1083-1105: Jan-Peter Siedlarek

Agent-wise–replication invariance, the Walrasian solution and the uniform rule pp. 357-377: William Thomson
The public provision of goods in democracies: Do age and inequality matter? pp. 379-415: Anirban Mitra
Prudent aggregation of quasi-hyperbolic experts pp. 417-444: Bach Dong-Xuan, Philippe Bich and Bertrand Wigniolle
Intellectual property rights protection and the dynamic gains from trade pp. 445-495: Damián Migueles Chazarreta and Ignat Stepanok
Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options pp. 497-517: Xiang Han and Junxiao Zhang
Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents pp. 519-560: Jean-Michel Benkert
Second-home tax and tax avoidance in the housing market pp. 561-601: Xiaokuai Shao and Ming Gao
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds pp. 603-655: Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann
Are survey stock price forecasts anchored by fundamental forecasts? A long-run perspective pp. 657-685: Pei Kuang, Li Tang, Renbin Zhang and Tongbin Zhang
Central bank communication and stabilization policies under firms’ motivated beliefs pp. 687-721: Camille Cornand and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira

Efficiency and equity in a socially-embedded economy pp. 1-56: Marc Fleurbaey, Ravi Kanbur and Dennis Snower
Hidden advertisement, signaling, and directed search pp. 57-87: Ji-Woong Moon
Expectations, beliefs and the business cycle: tracing back to the deep economic drivers pp. 89-149: Frédéric Dufourt, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti
Prize-allocation rules in generalized team contests pp. 151-179: Katsuya Kobayashi, Hideo Konishi and Kaoru Ueda
Two families of values for global cooperative games pp. 181-199: J. M. Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro and A. Jiménez-Losada
Network effects on information acquisition by DeGroot updaters pp. 201-234: Miguel Risco
How strength asymmetries shape multi-sided conflicts pp. 235-274: Sebastian Cortes-Corrales and Paul Gorny
The range of collective accuracy for binary classifications under majority rule pp. 275-300: Lu Hong and Scott E. Page
Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms pp. 301-340: Greg Kubitz, Lionel Page and Hao Wan
The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory pp. 341-356: Shu Huang and Russell Golman