Prize-allocation rules in generalized team contests

Katsuya Kobayashi, Hideo Konishi and Kaoru Ueda ()
Additional contact information
Katsuya Kobayashi: Hosei University
Hideo Konishi: Boston College
Kaoru Ueda: Nanzan University

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, issue 1, No 4, 179 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider a generalized team contest, in which the team’s effort is produced with a general technology represented by a concave homothetic function of team members’ contributions. Furthermore, we assume that the value of the contest’s prize depends on total effort exerted in the contest. We prove the existence of positive-effort Nash equilibrium for this generalized team contest under an arbitrary profile of the teams’ prize-allocation rules, and derive a simple characterization of the team-effort-maximizing prize-sharing rule. Although our basic model assumes that each individual in a group has constant marginal effort costs, it is possible to extend the results to the case where team members’ effort cost functions have increasing marginal costs with a constant elasticity.

Keywords: Team contest; Endogenous prize; Heterogeneity and complementarity of members; Prize allocation rule; Group cost minimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D43 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-024-01559-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01559-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01559-8

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().