Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds

Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann ()
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Kai Spiekermann: London School of Economics

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, issue 2, No 8, 603-655

Abstract: Abstract Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory’, ‘neutral’, but not necessarily ‘equal’, i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons.

Keywords: Jury theorems; Group deliberation; Social choice theory; Majority voting; Group competence; Sharing evidence; D70; D71; D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds (2025)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2024)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2023)
Working Paper: Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds (2022)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01595-4

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