Investing in influence: how minority interests can prevail in a democracy

Stergios Skaperdas () and Samarth Vaidya ()
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Stergios Skaperdas: University of California
Samarth Vaidya: Deakin University

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, issue 4, No 3, 1224 pages

Abstract: Abstract How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces that induce interest groups to select positions closer to that majority position. Resources, organization, and cognitive biases can induce one-sided outcomes. When we allow for long-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simplified tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented policies are even larger than those in the absence of long-term investments.

Keywords: Interest groups; Lobbying; Polarization; Persuasion; Regulatory capture; Contests; Democracy; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01634-8

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