The collective wisdom of behavioral game theory
Shu Huang () and
Russell Golman ()
Additional contact information
Shu Huang: Carnegie Mellon University
Russell Golman: Carnegie Mellon University
Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, issue 1, No 10, 356 pages
Abstract:
Abstract We apply an algorithm from the wisdom-of-crowds literature to optimally combine behavioral game theory models to more accurately predict strategic choice in one-shot, simultaneous-move games. We find that the optimal weighted average of seven behavioral game theory models predicts out-of-sample choice behavior significantly better than any of the individual models. The crowd of behavioral game theory models is wiser than any single one of them. Different strategic choice models complement each other by capturing distinct patterns of behavior. The field of behavioral game theory is enriched by having this diversity of models.
Keywords: Dual accumulator model; Level-k reasoning; Model aggregation; Noisy introspection; Strategic decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-024-01571-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01571-y
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01571-y
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils
More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().