Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Volume 26, issue 4, 2005

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule pp. 741-764

Alvaro Sandroni

Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium pp. 765-791

Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir and Nicholas Yannelis

On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information pp. 793-812

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz

Stock options and managerial optimal contracts pp. 813-837

Jorge Aseff and Manuel Santos

Continuity of the equilibrium price density and its uses in peak-load pricing pp. 839-866

Anthony Horsley and Andrew Wrobel

Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model pp. 867-885

Cyril Monnet and Erwan Quintin

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets pp. 887-906

Mich Tvede and Hervé Crès

Stable cartels revisited pp. 907-921

Effrosyni Diamantoudi

Asymmetric contests with general technologies pp. 923-946

Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley

Infinite inequality systems and cardinal revelations pp. 947-971

Marcel Richter and Kam-Chau Wong

Monotone continuous multiple priors pp. 973-982

Alain Chateauneuf, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Jean-Marc Tallon

Asymptotic prices in uniform-price multi-unit auctions pp. 983-987

Indranil Chakraborty and Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

The impact of prudence on optimal prevention pp. 989-994

Louis Eeckhoudt and Christian Gollier

Ambiguity, measurability and multiple priors pp. 995-1006

Massimiliano Amarante

Fixed endpoint optimal control pp. 1007-1012

Frank Caliendo and Saket Pande

Volume 26, issue 3, 2005

Multidimensional generalized Gini indices pp. 471-496

Thibault Gajdos and John Weymark

The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior pp. 497-516

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana Ania

Herd behaviour as an incentive scheme pp. 517-536

Nicolas Melissas

Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord - banks’ choice of loan rating system pp. 537-557

Eva Catarineu-Rabell, Patricia Jackson and Dimitrios Tsomocos

Excess price volatility and financial innovation pp. 559-587

Alessandro Citanna and Karl Schmedders

Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good pp. 589-606

Shinji Ohseto

Winning probabilities in a pairwise lottery system with three alternatives pp. 607-617

Frederick Chen and Jac Heckelman

Approval voting reconsidered pp. 619-628

Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan

Endogenous fluctuations in unionized economies with productive externalities pp. 629-649

Rui Coimbra, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Leonor Modesto

What do information frictions do? pp. 651-675

Joydeep Bhattacharya and Shankha Chakraborty

An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information pp. 677-699

Boğaçhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv

The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency pp. 701-716

Peter Rangazas and Steven Russell

The fuzzy core and the $(\Pi, \beta)$ -balanced core pp. 717-724

Arkadi Predtetchinski

Temporal and thermodynamic irreversibility in production theory pp. 725-728

Stefan Baumgärtner

Designer path independent choice functions pp. 729-740

Mark Johnson and Richard Dean

Volume 26, issue 2, 2005

Foreword to ‘Rationality and Equilibrium’ - A Symposium in honor of Marcel K. Richter pp. 243-244

Charalambos Aliprantis, Rosa Matzkin, Daniel McFadden, James Moore and Nicholas Yannelis

Revealed stochastic preference: a synthesis pp. 245-264

Daniel McFadden

Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’ pp. 265-299

Luca Anderlini and Roger Lagunoff

The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games pp. 301-308

Lin Zhou

Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences pp. 309-332

Sophie Bade

Remarks concerning concave utility functions on finite sets pp. 333-344

Yakar Kannai

Walrasian versus quasi-competitive equilibrium and the core of a production economy pp. 345-359

James Moore

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces pp. 361-381

Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García and Nicholas Yannelis

Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations pp. 383-396

Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Wooders

Existence of equilibria for economies with externalities and a measure space of consumers pp. 397-421

Bernard Cornet and Mihaela Topuzu

Identification of consumers’ preferences when their choices are unobservable pp. 423-443

Rosa Matzkin

Log-concave probability and its applications pp. 445-469

Mark Bagnoli and Ted Bergstrom

Volume 26, issue 1, 2005

‘Expected utility / subjective probability’ analysis without the sure-thing principle or probabilistic sophistication pp. 1-62

Mark Machina

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium pp. 63-83

Robert Becker and Subir Chakrabarti

General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard pp. 85-101

Luis Braido

Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal pp. 103-114

Jose Alcalde, María Marco and José Silva

An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains pp. 115-128

Biung-Ghi Ju

Type space on a purely measurable parameter space pp. 129-139

Miklós Pintér

New financial markets: who gains and who loses pp. 141-166

Paul Willen

Consistent firm choice and the theory of supply pp. 167-175

Indraneel Dasgupta

Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects pp. 177-201

Peter Kennedy and Ian King

Eliciting the core of a supermodular capacity pp. 203-209

Robert Chambers and Tigran Melkonyan

Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem pp. 211-215

John Geanakoplos

On the characterization of excess demand functions pp. 217-225

Marwan Aloqeili

The separability principle in bargaining pp. 227-235

Youngsub Chun

Large games with transformed summary statistics pp. 237-241

Haomiao Yu and Wei Zhu