Asymmetric contests with general technologies

Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley ()

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 4, 923-946

Abstract: We investigate the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of asymmetric, winner-take-all, imperfectly discriminating contests, focussing on existence, uniqueness and rent dissipation. When the contest success function is determined by a production function with decreasing returns for each contestant, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. If marginal product is also bounded, limiting total expenditure is equal to the value of the prize in large contests even if contestants differ. Partial dissipation occurs only when infinite marginal products are permitted. Our analysis relies heavily on the use of ‘share functions’ and we discuss their theory and application. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Contests; Rent-seeking; Noncooperative games; Share functions; Share correspondences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (273)

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Working Paper: Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5

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