Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 2, 383-396

Abstract: A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Monotonicity; Cooperative games; Clubs; Games with side payments (TU games); Cyclic monotonicity; Law of scarcity; Law of demand; Approximate cores; Effective small groups; Parameterized collections of games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Laws of Scarcity for a Finite Game: Exact Bounds on Estimations (2003)
Working Paper: Laws of Scarcity for a Finite Game: Exact Bounds on Estimations (2003)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0443-7

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