Laws of Scarcity for a Finite Game: Exact Bounds on Estimations

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: A "law of scarcity" is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payout vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payo® vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated.

Keywords: monotonicity; cooperative games; clubs; games with side payments (TU games); cyclic monotonicity; law of scarcity; law of demand; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp691.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Laws of scarcity for a finite game - exact bounds on estimations (2005)
Working Paper: Laws of Scarcity for a Finite Game: Exact Bounds on Estimations (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:691

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().