Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium
Robert Becker and
Subir Chakrabarti ()
Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 1, 63-83
We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the player’s action set. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Satisficing behavior; Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem; Better responses; Best responses; Cournot duopoly; Weighted expected utility; Bimatrix games; n-person games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:63-83
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils
More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().