The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games

Lin Zhou

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 2, 308 pages

Abstract: In this paper I study a class of two-player games, in which both players’ action sets are [0,1] and their payoff functions are continuous in joint actions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset A of $[0,1]\times [0,1]$ to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Revealed preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0560-y

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