Augmented serial rules for an excludable public good

Shinji Ohseto ()

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 3, 589-606

Abstract: We present a new class of rules named “augmented serial rules” for the provision of an excludable public good. First, we characterize this class by the four axioms of strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, access independence, and nonbossiness. Second, we identify two important subclasses by imposing an additional axiom: (i) “anonymous augmented serial rules” by anonymity, and (ii) Moulin’s serial rule by individual rationality. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Excludable public good; Strategy-proofness; Augmented serial rules. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0536-y

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