Economic Theory
1991 - 2025
Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils
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Springer
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Volume 38, issue 3, 2009
- Symposium on organization, heterogeneity and trade pp. 433-436

- Giovanni Facchini and Thierry Verdier
- Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium pp. 437-464

- Dalia Marin and Thierry Verdier
- Cultural differences, insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision pp. 465-484

- Jiahua Che and Giovanni Facchini
- Outsourcing of innovation pp. 485-515

- Edwin Lai, Raymond Riezman and Ping Wang
- Offshoring and product innovation pp. 517-532

- Alireza Naghavi and Gianmarco Ottaviano
- Firm heterogeneity and Ricardian comparative advantage within and across sectors pp. 533-559

- Toshihiro Okubo
- Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer pp. 561-592

- Hector Calvo-Pardo
Volume 38, issue 2, 2009
- Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information pp. 217-219

- Dionysius Glycopantis, Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Konrad Podczeck
- Equilibria in incomplete assets economies with infinite dimensional spot markets pp. 221-262

- Charalambos Aliprantis and Rabee Tourky
- Large economies with differential information and without free disposal pp. 263-286

- Laura Angeloni and V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha
- Elimination of arbitrage states in asymmetric information models pp. 287-293

- Bernard Cornet and Lionel Boisdeffre
- Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states pp. 295-320

- Carlos Hervés-Beloso, V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Paulo Monteiro
- A market game approach to differential information economies pp. 321-330

- Guadalupe Fugarolas-Alvarez-Ude, Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez
- The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies pp. 331-350

- Giovanna Bimonte and Maria Graziano
- On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium pp. 351-369

- Dionysius Glycopantis, Allan Muir and Nicholas Yannelis
- Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information pp. 371-383

- Claudia Meo
- Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium pp. 385-397

- Erik Balder and Nicholas Yannelis
- On purification of measure-valued maps pp. 399-418

- Konrad Podczeck
- Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents pp. 419-432

- Nicholas Yannelis
Volume 38, issue 1, 2009
- Introduction to the Symposium pp. 1-7

- George Deltas
- Auctions with a buy price pp. 9-39

- Stanley Reynolds and John Wooders
- Auctions with costly information acquisition pp. 41-72

- Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel and Charles Zheng
- Auction design with opportunity cost pp. 73-103

- Jingfeng Lu
- Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints pp. 105-124

- Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo
- Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect pp. 125-135

- Simon Board
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option pp. 137-168

- Subir Bose and Arup Daripa
- Biased procurement auctions pp. 169-185

- Leonardo Rezende
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices pp. 187-216

- Robert Zeithammer
Volume 37, issue 3, 2008
- A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games pp. 357-394

- Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
- Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy pp. 395-416

- Erwan Quintin
- On the nonexistence of recursive equilibrium in stochastic OLG economies pp. 417-437

- Alessandro Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi
- Consumption externalities: a representative consumer model when agents are heterogeneous pp. 439-467

- Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa and Stephen J Turnovsky
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials pp. 469-490

- Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Benny Moldovanu
- Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models pp. 491-507

- Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi
- On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents pp. 509-519

- Harold Houba and Quan Wen
- Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information pp. 521-532

- Haifeng Fu
- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games pp. 533-542

- Bertrand Tchantcho and Lawrence Diffo Lambo
Volume 37, issue 2, 2008
- On the completeness of complete markets pp. 171-201

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Kirsten Rohde
- Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model pp. 203-241

- Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Marco Ottaviani and Lise Vesterlund
- On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships pp. 243-265

- Frank Gigler and Thomas Hemmer
- Petty corruption pp. 267-280

- Seung Han Yoo
- An ascending double auction pp. 281-306

- Michael Peters and Sergei Severinov
- Task scheduling and moral hazard pp. 307-320

- Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick Schmitz
- Existence of solutions in continuous-time optimal growth models pp. 321-333

- Hippolyte d’Albis, Pascal Gourdel and Cuong Le van
- Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game pp. 335-345

- Rodrigo Harrison and Roberto Muñoz
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations pp. 347-356

- Toyotaka Sakai
Volume 37, issue 1, 2008
- General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection pp. 1-29

- Aldo Rustichini and Paolo Siconolfi
- Optimal balanced growth in a general multi-sector endogenous growth model with constant returns pp. 31-49

- Harutaka Takahashi
- Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game pp. 51-80

- Stefano Barbieri and David Malueg
- von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies pp. 81-98

- Toshiyuki Hirai
- The objective of a privately owned firm under imperfect competition pp. 99-118

- Camelia Bejan
- Preferences over location-scale family pp. 119-146

- Wing-Keung Wong and Chenghu Ma
- Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities pp. 147-159

- Dionysius Glycopantis and Allan Muir
- On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes pp. 161-169

- Sunanda Roy and Tarun Sabarwal