Economic Theory

1991 - 2025

Current editor(s): Nichoals Yanneils

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Springer
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)
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Informational efficiency with ambiguous information pp. 229-242: Scott Condie and Jayant Ganguli
Ambiguity aversion and trade pp. 243-273: Luciano Castro and Alain Chateauneuf
Decision making and trade without probabilities pp. 275-288: John Dickhaut, Radhika Lunawat, Kira Pronin and Jack Stecher
Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study pp. 289-312: Adam Dominiak and Wendelin Schnedler
Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous? pp. 313-339: Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey
Rational preferences under ambiguity pp. 341-375: Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Marciano Siniscalchi
Strategic games beyond expected utility pp. 377-398: Thomas Jungbauer and Klaus Ritzberger
Definitions of ambiguous events and the smooth ambiguity model pp. 399-424: Peter Klibanoff, Massimo Marinacci and Sujoy Mukerji
Event-Separability in the Ellsberg urn pp. 425-436: Mark Machina
Risk, ambiguity, and state-preference theory pp. 437-467: Robert Nau
Liquidity and asset prices in rational expectations equilibrium with ambiguous information pp. 469-491: Han Ozsoylev and Jan Werner
Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences pp. 493-518: Vassili Vergopoulos
Core and equilibria under ambiguity pp. 519-548: Luciano Castro, Marialaura Pesce and Nicholas Yannelis

Symposium on: Existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games pp. 1-4: Guilherme Carmona
On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games pp. 5-16: Pavlo Prokopovych
Strategic approximations of discontinuous games pp. 17-29: Philip Reny
Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games pp. 31-45: Guilherme Carmona
An equilibrium closure result for discontinuous games pp. 47-65: Erik Balder
Equilibrium existence and approximation of regular discontinuous games pp. 67-85: Luciano Castro
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality pp. 87-123: Stefano Galavotti, Nozomu Muto and Daisuke Oyama
A theory of Bayesian decision making with action-dependent subjective probabilities pp. 125-146: Edi Karni
Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets pp. 147-169: Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama
A dynamic two country Heckscher–Ohlin model with non-homothetic preferences pp. 171-204: Eric Bond, Kazumichi Iwasa and Kazuo Nishimura
Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents pp. 205-218: Marta Faias, Carlos Hervés-Beloso and Emma Moreno-García

Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction pp. 189-204: Mordecai Kurz
Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts pp. 205-246: Roger Guesnerie and Pedro Jara-Moroni
The diversity of forecasts from macroeconomic models of the US economy pp. 247-292: Volker Wieland and Maik Wolters
Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia pp. 293-335: Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese
Financial leverage and market volatility with diverse beliefs pp. 337-364: Wen-Chung Guo, Frank Wang and Ho-Mou Wu
Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations pp. 365-393: William Branch and George Evans
Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations pp. 395-421: William Branch and Bruce McGough
Animal spirits and monetary policy pp. 423-457: Paul Grauwe
Price stabilizing, Pareto improving policies pp. 459-500: Carsten Nielsen

A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels pp. 1-27: Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Sahuguet
Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames pp. 29-74: Emmanuel Dechenaux and Dan Kovenock
Coarse matching with incomplete information pp. 75-104: Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer, Benny Moldovanu and Emre Ozdenoren
Networks of common property resources pp. 105-134: Rahmi İlkılıç
On myopia as rationale for social security pp. 135-158: Torben Andersen and Joydeep Bhattacharya
Rules of origin and gains from trade pp. 159-173: Earl Grinols and Peri Silva
Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems pp. 175-188: Rene van den Brink, Ilya Katsev and Gerard van der Laan

A bargaining model in general equilibrium pp. 327-375: Michele Gori and Antonio Villanacci
On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms pp. 377-399: Amanda Friedenberg and Martin Meier
On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms pp. 377-399: Amanda Friedenberg and Martin Meier
Unambiguous events and dynamic Choquet preferences pp. 401-425: Adam Dominiak and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Transition choice probabilities and welfare analysis in additive random utility models pp. 427-454: André de Palma and Karim Kilani
On discounted dynamic programming with unbounded returns pp. 455-474: Janusz Matkowski and Andrzej Nowak
Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment pp. 475-501: Weerachart Kilenthong

Investment dynamics in electricity markets pp. 149-187: Alfredo Garcia and Ennio Stacchetti
Fiat money and the value of binding portfolio constraints pp. 189-209: Mario Pascoa, Myrian Petrassi and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez
Choosing the two finalists pp. 211-219: Kfir Eliaz, Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein
A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market pp. 221-254: Stefano Demichelis and Klaus Ritzberger
Tops-only domains pp. 255-282: Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen
Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses pp. 283-295: Yoichi Kasajima and Rodrigo Velez
Variety-skill complementarity: a simple resolution of the trade-wage inequality anomaly pp. 297-325: Yoshinori Kurokawa

Optimism and firm formation pp. 1-38: Luca Rigotti, Matthew Ryan and Rhema Vaithianathan
Correlated risks, bivariate utility and optimal choices pp. 39-54: Michel Denuit, Louis Eeckhoudt and Mario Menegatti
Incomplete markets and the output–inflation tradeoff pp. 55-84: Yann Algan, Edouard Challe and Xavier Ragot
On preferences with infinitely many subjective states pp. 85-98: Kalyan Chatterjee and R. Krishna
Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry pp. 99-125: Jeanine Miklós-Thal
Loss aversion pp. 127-148: Pavlo Blavatskyy