The separability principle in bargaining

Youngsub Chun

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 1, 227-235

Abstract: We investigate the implications of the separability principle in the context of bargaining. For two bargaining problems with the same population, suppose that there is a subgroup of agents who receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. Moreover, if we imagine the departure of this subgroup with their payoffs, then the remaining agents face the same opportunities in both bargaining problems. The separability principle requires that under these hypotheses, the remaining agents should receive the same payoffs in both bargaining problems. We begin with investigating the logical relations between separability and two other axioms, contraction independence and consistency. Then, we establish characterizations of the Nash and egalitarian solutions on the basis of separability. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Bargaining problem; Axiomatic approach; Separability principle; Nash solution; Egalitarian solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-004-0512-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:227-235

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0512-6

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().