The perils of a coherent narrative

Alessandro Ispano

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 80, issue 3, No 4, 745-759

Abstract: Abstract A persuader influences a decision maker by providing a narrative for interpreting upcoming news. The decision maker adopts the narrative if it does not distort the marginal distribution of news. Both parties can benefit if the persuader can provide news-contingent (overall incoherent) narratives, privately learn the truth, or design the process of news arrival.

Keywords: Interpretation; Consistency; Misspecification; Manipulation; Model; Persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01640-w

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