Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

Diego Moreno () and María Moscoso ()

Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 52, issue 1, 315-336

Abstract: We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator’s preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Allocation mechanisms; Strategy-proofness; Dictatorship; Public goods; Efficiency; D6; D7; H4; P1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0627-5

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