Does moral play equilibrate?

Immanuel Bomze, Werner Schachinger and Jörgen Weibull
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Immanuel Bomze: University of Vienna
Werner Schachinger: University of Vienna

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 1, No 11, 305-315

Abstract: Abstract Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the “right thing to do” may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between players of arbitrary degrees of morality. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter examples.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Morality; Homo moralis; Social preferences; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D64 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Does moral play equilibrate? (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4

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