Does moral play equilibrate?

Immanuel Bomze, Werner Schachinger and Jörgen Weibull

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players. The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between arbitrarily moral players. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter-examples.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; morality; homo moralis; social preferences; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D64 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Does moral play equilibrate? (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:89555

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