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Competitive equilibria in a comonotone market

Tim J. Boonen (), Fangda Liu () and Ruodu Wang ()
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Tim J. Boonen: University of Amsterdam
Fangda Liu: University of Waterloo
Ruodu Wang: University of Waterloo

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 72, issue 4, No 6, 1217-1255

Abstract: Abstract We investigate competitive equilibria in a special type of incomplete markets, referred to as a comonotone market, where agents can only trade such that their risk allocation is comonotonic. The comonotone market is motivated by the no-sabotage condition. For instance, in a standard insurance market, the allocation of risk among the insured, the insurer and the reinsurers is assumed to be comonotonic a priori to the risk-exchange. Two popular classes of preferences in risk management and behavioral economics, dual utilities (DU) and rank-dependent expected utilities (RDU), are used to formulate agents’ objectives. We present various results on properties and characterization of competitive equilibria in this framework, and in particular their relation to complete markets. For DU-comonotone markets, we find the equilibrium in closed form and for RDU-comonotone markets, we find the equilibrium in closed form in special cases. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics are established in both the DU and RDU markets. We further propose an algorithm to numerically obtain competitive equilibria based on discretization, which works for both the DU-comonotone market and the RDU-comonotone market. Although the comonotone and complete markets are closely related, many of our findings are intriguing and in sharp contrast to results in the literature on complete markets in terms of existence, uniqueness, and closed-form solutions of the equilibria, and comonotonicity of the pricing kernel.

Keywords: Competitive equilibria; Comonotone market; Dual utilities; Rank-dependent utilities; Pricing kernel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D86 G10 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01319-4

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