Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests

Ori Haimanko ()

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 3, No 14, 1258 pages

Abstract: Abstract We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in contests where each contestant’s probability to win is continuous in efforts outside the zero-effort profile, monotone in his own effort, and greater that 1/2 if that contestant is the only one exerting positive effort. General type spaces, and in particular a continuum of information types, are allowed. As a corollary, the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium is established in generalized Tullock contests, where the probability to win is strictly concave in one’s own effort for any non-zero effort profile of other players.

Keywords: Contests; Tullock lottery; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Equilibrium existence; Absolute continuity of information; Continuum of types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN (ALMOST CONTINUOUS) CONTESTS (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01358-5

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