Auctions with shill bidding

Indranil Chakraborty () and Georgia Kosmopoulou

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 24, issue 2, 287 pages

Abstract: Shill bidding has increased substantially in recent years since the technology employed to conduct on-line auctions enables many sellers to disguise their identities and bid. Although their intent is to gain by misleading the bidders on the value of the object, we show that in a common value auction sellers are worse off shill bidding. In fact, any out-of-auction mechanism that makes it difficult for them to shill bid increases their revenues. In addition, shill bidding reduces the surplus of the bidders and the surplus from trade. It is only the auctioneer who could gain from this activity and in that sense he may not have an incentive from within the auction to discourage shill bidding. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Auction; Shill bidding; Seller participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0423-y

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