Undecidability of the existence of pure Nash equilibria

N. Sofronidis ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 2, 423-428

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show that for any positive integer n, there exists no algorithm which decides for each non-cooperative n-person game in strategic form with partially computable payoff functions whether it has a pure Nash equilibrium or not. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Undecidable problems; Non-cooperative games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0394-z

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