The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline

Antoni Cunyat ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 2, 455-465

Abstract: This note explores the consequences of a player's freedom of choice over his degree of commitment for the bargaining outcome. In particular, we modify the nonstationary structure of Fershtman and Seidmann (1993)'s bargaining by allowing one player to possess imperfect commitments where the degree of commitment is chosen prior to the negotiation stage. We show that a player optimally chooses an intermediate degree of irrevocability provided the costs of increasing the degree of commitment are small enough. In this case, not only an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment is effective. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Deadline; Degree of commitment; Endogenous commitment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0380-5

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