Distributive politics and economic growth: the Markovian Stackelberg solution

Ines Lindner () and Holger Strulik

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 2, 439-444

Abstract: We generalize the result of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) by showing that their static solution is also a time consistent Stackelberg solution of a differential game between the government and the median voter. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Economic growth; Inequality; Differential game; Time-consistency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0367-2

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