Dynamic provision of public goods

Francisco Candel-Sánchez ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 3, 641 pages

Abstract: This paper deals with implementing the efficient level of public good provision in a dynamic setting. First, we prove that when the good is provided in several stages, no sequence of Groves' mechanisms guarantees that agents will reveal their true valuations as a dominant strategy. The contribution of this paper is the characterization of those mechanisms which guarantee truthful revelation in this environment. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Public goods; Strategy-proof mechanisms; Groves' mechanisms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0384-1

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