Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents

Michael Peters ()

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 23, issue 1, 183-194

Abstract: This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Common agency; Multiple agency; Menus of alternatives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0365-4

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