Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu (), Hans Haller () and Philippe Solal

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 2, 445-454

Abstract: We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Spatial games; NP-completeness; Graph k-colorability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem (2004)
Working Paper: Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0376-1

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