Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Richard Baron (), Jacques Durieu (), Hans Haller and Philippe Solal
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Richard Baron: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne
Jacques Durieu: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne
Hans Haller: Department of economics - Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University [Blacksburg]

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Date: 2004-01-01
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Published in Economic Theory, 2004, 23 (2), pp.445-1. ⟨10.1007/s00199-003-0376-1⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem (2004)
Working Paper: Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03216508

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0376-1

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