Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

Meglena Jeleva () and Bertrand Villeneuve

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 4, 777-794

Abstract: This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Imprecise probabilities; Insurance markets; Adverse selection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Insurance Contracts with Imprecise Probabilities and Adverse Selection (1997)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x

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