Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

Shinji Ohseto ()

Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 3, 659-670

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Indivisible goods; Egalitarian-equivalence; Strategy-proofness; Nash implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0369-0

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