Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing
Lawrence Ausubel () and
Peter Cramton ()
Economic Theory, 2004, vol. 23, issue 3, 493-505
We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
Keywords: Auctions; Vickrey auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Reserve price; Resale. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (1999)
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